VI. The Deportations

1. The Initial Situation

Beginning in 1942, Jews from the German Reich and from states occupied or allied with it were sent in massive numbers to concentration camps and ghettos in Polish territory and lesser numbers were sent to concentration camps in the Reich and camps and ghettos in the occupied Soviet territories. The numbers of those displaced is known very accurately for most of the states in question, thanks to the German deportation lists which have been preserved. From Serge Klarsfeld’s research, for example, we know that barely 76,000 Jews were deported from France, which corresponds to a fifth of the Jews living in France, most of them holding foreign passports. For Belgium, the Netherlands and other west European states and for the German Reich, the numbers are also largely undisputed. For Hungary, the number of Jewish deportees is generally recognized to be 438,000, and is only questioned by a single reputable scholar, the American Professor Arthur Butz. However, the deportations from Poland, the demographic core area of European Jewry, are very incompletely documented

75 In his study *Le Mémorial de la Déportation des Juifs de France* (Beate and Serge Klarsfeld, Paris 1978) Klarsfeld states that the number of deported French Jews was 75,721. The margin of error cannot be more than 1-2%.

76 Thus most Jews who were French nationals were not affected. How does this coincide with the claimed policy of systematic extermination of the Jews?

77 In the chapter “Hungarian Jews” of his book *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century, op. cit.* (note 47), Butz defends the theory that the Veesenmayer Dispatches, which have been used to prove that the number of deportees from Hungary was 438,000, are forgeries, and that the number of Jews deported from Hungary was in reality no more than 100,000. One piece of evidence he cites supporting this argument, among others, is a report of the ICRC on its activities in Hungary dating from 1948, in which there is no mention of mass deportations in the Spring and early Summer of 1944. Although we do not consider Butz’ theory to be definitively disproven, we assume the generally recognized numbers of deportations are correct, since these are supported not only by the Veesenmayer Dispatches, but also by documents from neutral states dating from during the war. For a further discussion on the 1944 deportations of Hungarian Jews, see Jürgen Graf, “What Happened to the Jews Who Were Deported to Auschwitz but Were Not Registered There?”, *The Journal of Historical Review*, 19(4) (2000), p. 4-18, and Arthur Butz, “On the 1944 Deportations of Hungarian Jews”, *The Journal of Historical Review*, 19(4) (2000), p. 19-28.

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and the numbers given in the official historical writing are very question-
able.

Consequently, in the no less than 515 pages (DEJ, 470 pages) that Hilberg devotes to the deportations in the second volume of his work, he moves on largely firm documentary ground with respect to the dates and destinations of the deportations as well as the number of those displaced, with the exception of the key country Poland. He turns first to the situation in that part of Europe where the National Socialists were able to carry out their Jewish policy at their discretion, namely, the Reich itself, the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Generalgouvernement and then to those countries where they had to pay more or less respect to domestic governments or at least administrations; Hungary is an example of the first, the Netherlands of the second.

These 515 pages demonstrate clearly Hilberg’s strategy of puffing up his work with quantities of useless details.

He inundates his reader with an endless flood of information that has no bearing on the subject named in the title of his work, the “destruction of the European Jews”. He tells us the Minister of Mines in the Croatian Pavelic regime was named Frkovic, that the Minister of Commerce in the Slovakian Tiso regime was Stano, that the Minister of Public Health in the Romanian Antonescu regime was Tomescu and other useless items. He spends no less than seven pages (pp. 428-435; DEJ, pp. 410-416) belaboring the “administrative juggernaut” of the Reich railways in detail and bores his reader to tears with a pedantic enumeration of the state secretaries for the Reich railways in the Ministry of Commerce.

In order to reach the desired number of pages he mixes in painstakingly collected anecdotes like the following:

“On October 3, 1942, the Propaganda Division in Radom reported a disturbing incident that had resulted from the dispatch of a postcard. The Germans published a paper in Poland, the Krakauer Zeitung, for the local German population. The chief of the Radom branch of the paper had received from Lwów a postcard that began (in German): ‘I don’t know German. You can translate everything from Polish into German.’ The card then continued in Polish:

You old whore and you old son of a whore Richard (In the German translation: Alte Hurenmetze und du alter Hurenbock Richard). A child has been born to you. May your child suffer throughout his life, as we Jews have suffered because of you. I wish you that from the bottom of my heart.

This anonymous note actually disturbed its recipient and worried the propaganda experts. The Propaganda Division feared that it was the beginning of a flood of postcards, and the card was transmitted to the Security Police for tracing.” (p. 548; DEJ, p. 522)
2. The Purpose of the Deportations: Labor Deployment versus Extermination

As the war continued, the labor shortage in the German Reich and in the countries under its sway took more and more dramatic forms. An immense quantity of documents testify as to how desperately the National Socialists constantly sought to recruit new workers for their industries—especially their war industries. The deployment of Jewish labor forces played a critical role here. In addition to the Jewish workers living in relative freedom—inhabitants of the Łódź ghetto, for example, who manufactured steel helmets for the Wehrmacht—hundreds of thousands of Jews were sent to concentration camps and labor camps as forced labor or were forced to work in the armaments industry.

Since, as Hilberg says, the Germans pursued a policy of systematic extermination of the Jews, for him the deportations can logically have had only one purpose, to transport the deportees to this very extermination. Now there is considerable documentary evidence for shockingly high death rates in camps and ghettos caused by typhus and other epidemics and also by lack of nutrition, but none for a German goal of extermination and, in particular, none for the presence of ‘extermination camps’ in which Jews were murdered with gas. On the other hand, many documents demonstrate the deployment of Jews in the war economy. Here are a few examples:

On 25th January 1942, five days after the Wannsee Conference, Heinrich Himmler wrote to the General Inspector of Concentration Camps, Richard Glücks:78

"Arrange for the induction of 100,000 male Jews and up to 50,000 female Jews into the concentration camps. The concentration camps will be asked to perform great economic tasks in the next few weeks. SS-Gruppenführer Pohl79 will give you further details."

On 30th April 1942, at a time when—according to the official version of history—a hundred thousandfold mass extermination was under way in Chelmno and Bełżec and the same thing was about to start in two further ‘extermination camps’, Sobibór and Auschwitz, Oswald Pohl wrote Himmler a note saying:80

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78 NO-500.
79 Oswald Pohl was director of the WVHA (Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt) of the SS.
80 R-129.
“The war has brought a visible change in the structure of the concentration camps and has fundamentally changed their responsibilities with respect to the deployment of prisoners. The influx of prisoners due to security, reeducation or preventive reasons alone no longer stands in the foreground. The main focus has moved to the economic side. The mobilization of all prisoner labor forces, first for war purposes (armaments industries) and later for peacetime purposes now moves to the foreground.

Necessary measures follow from this realization which require the gradual conversion of the concentration camps from their earlier one-sided political form to an organization conforming to the economic requirements.”

On 21st August 1942, a month after Hilberg and other ‘Holocaust’ giants tell us Treblinka was put in operation as a fifth ‘extermination camp’, Martin Luther, Chief of the German Section of the Foreign Office, wrote in a memorandum:81

“The fundamental principle of German Jewish policy after taking power consisted in furthering Jewish emigration by all possible means. The present war gives Germany the opportunity and the duty to resolve the Jewish question in Europe. [...] Based on the above-mentioned Führer instruction [a Hitler decision taken in August 1940 to remove all Jews from Europe] the evacuation of Jews out of Germany was begun. It was advisable as soon as possible to get hold of the Jewish nationals of countries who had likewise taken measures with respect to the Jews. [...] The number of Jews removed to the East in this way did not suffice to meet the requirements for labor forces there.”

This sets down point blank that the removal of Jews to the East was for the purpose of utilization of their labor power.

The extremely high death rates in the camps, caused mostly by epidemics, but also by poor nourishment and poor clothing, naturally detracted heavily from their economic usefulness. For this reason, on 28th December 1942 Glücks sent a general notice to all concentration camp commanders in which he held them personally responsible for the conservation of their prisoner labor forces. He wrote:82

“The senior camp medical doctors will use all the means at their disposal to insure that mortality rates in the several camps decrease substantially. [...] The camp medical doctors should supervise the nutrition of the prisoners more closely than before and submit proposals for improvements in conformance with the administrative measures of the camp commanders.

81 NG-2586.
82 NO-1523.
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These should not only be put on paper, but should be regularly monitored by the camp medical doctors. [...] The Reichsführer SS has ordered that mortality absolutely must be reduced.”

Himmler issued this order for the reduction of mortality at a time when, according to Hilberg and the other ‘Holocaust’ historians, six ‘extermination camps’ were running full blast, since gassing had supposedly begun two months before in Majdanek, the sixth ‘death factory’. It could hardly be more clearly shown how the annihilation theory however framed has no connection with the facts backed by documentation.

In fact, the conditions in the camps improved markedly as a result of this directive and the mortality sank by almost 80% within eight months.83

On 26th October 1943, at a time when Hilberg tells us 4.3 million Jews had already been exterminated and the extermination of 800,000 more was yet to come (p. 1300; DEJ, na), Oswald Pohl sent a general notice to the commanders of 19 concentration camps, in which he stated:84

“In the framework of German armaments production, thanks to the improvement efforts that have been undertaken in the past 2 years, the concentration camps have become of decisive importance in the war. From nothing we have built armaments works that are second to none.

We now have to redouble our efforts to make sure that the production levels so far achieved are not only maintained, but further improved. That will be possible, as long as the works and factories remain intact, only by maintaining and even improving the labor capacity of the prisoners.

In earlier years, given the reeducational policy of the time, it did not matter much whether or not a prisoner could perform useful work. Now, however, the labor capacity of the prisoners is important, and all measures of the commanders, director of the liaison service and medical doctors should be extended to maintaining the health and efficiency of the prisoners. Not from phony sympathy, but because we need them with their arms and their legs, because they must contribute to a great victory for the German people, we must take the well-being of the prisoners to heart.

I want this to be the primary goal: no more than 10% of all prisoners should be unable to work due to sickness. All responsible persons should work together to achieve this goal. This will require:

1) proper and fitting nourishment,
2) proper and fitting clothing,
3) utilization of all natural health measures
4) avoidance of all effort not necessary for the performance of work,
5) performance bonuses.”

83 PS-1469.
84 Archiwum Muzeum Stutthof I-1b-8, p. 53.
Just eight days later, on 3rd November 1943, Hilberg tells us, the Germans shot over 40,000 Jewish workers in Majdanek and two of its outlying camps (p. 559; DEJ, p. 532 states they shot “as many as 17,000 workers in a single operation”!

For 1944 also, we are in possession of a large number of documents which show the deployment of—mostly Jewish—prisoners in the armaments industry; on 11th May, for example, Adolf Hitler personally ordered the deployment of 200,000 Jews in the framework of the fighter construction program.85 A few days later, Hilberg and his consorts again tell us, the first death trains with Hungarian Jews were on their way to Birkenau. Further comment would be superfluous.

Because of the large number of documents concerning the economic aspects of the deportations, it was not possible for Hilberg to simply skip the subject. He devotes 20 pages (pp. 550-570; DEJ, pp. 523-542) to the subject in connection with the deportation of Polish Jews and also provides several concrete examples of the utilization of Jewish labor. On p. 551 (DEJ, pp. 524f.), for example, he writes:

“In Upper Silesia tens of thousands of Jews had been drawn from ghettos into camps by the Organisation Schmelt, an agency in charge of labor impressment in the Silesian region.139 Thousands were employed in the construction of war plants. They were indispensable enough to cause Obergruppenführer Schmauser, the Higher SS and Police Leader of Upper Silesia, to write to Himmler in April 1942 that replacements for 6,500 Jews in major construction projects (Grossbauten) would hardly be available.140 Several months later, when Krupp was planning to build a plant for the production of naval artillery at Markstädt, near Breslau, the firm discovered that the Organisation Todt (Speer’s construction agency) was employing many Jews in projects nearby. With the ‘complete approval’ of Vizeadmiral Fanger, Krupp suggested that these Jews stay on to erect the naval factory.141 In 1944 the Silesian Krupp plant was still employing thousands of these Jews.”

On p. 564 (DEJ, p. 537) Hilberg provides a list of “more important enterprises with Jewish labor forces”; there are 17 firms on the list. (DEJ lists 16 firms)

The absurdity of the idea that the Germans urgently in need of laborers had wantonly annihilated an immense number of exactly these laborers is uncommonly embarrassing for the defenders of the extermination theory. They regularly resort to the argument that only Jews unfit for work were gassed and that those fit for work were left alive. This evasion utterly con-
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contradicts the assertion of these same historians that the Germans indiscriminately gassed all Jews irrespective of age or health in four to six extermination camps\(^{86}\) and thereby destroyed many hundreds of thousands of potentially valuable laborers. If there had been an annihilation policy, there must have been some logic to it, but there is no recognizable logic to the policy that Hilberg and his consorts ascribe to the NS regime.

In order to alleviate these screaming contradictions somewhat, Hilberg invents internecine warfare within the NS leadership between the advocates of annihilation and its opponents. For example, on p. 552 (DEJ, p. 525) he asserts:

“The year 1942 was a time when the civil administration, the Ostbahn, private firms under contract to the military commander or the Armament Inspectorate, as well as the SS itself, were all making use of Jewish labor in various business ventures. Foremost among the offices [sic] attempting to check the flow of irreplaceable Jewish workers into the killing centers were the military commander, General Gienanth, and the armament inspector, Generalleutnant Schindler.”

No source is given, because the attempt to curb the disappearance of irreplaceable Jewish workers into the killing centers attributed to generals von Gienanth and Schindler is Hilberg’s own invention. To prove that such an attempt had been made—naturally, without bothering about documentary support—Hilberg would first of all have had to produce evidence for the existence of the killing centers, and this he has still not done in 552 pages.

3. Hilberg’s Invented Mass Shootings in Galicia

On p. 521 (DEJ, p. 496) the exalted high priest of the ‘Holocaust’ informs his readers as follows:

“In Stanisławow [a town in Galicia], about 10,000 Jews had been gathered at a cemetery and shot on October 12, 1941. Another shooting took place in March 1942, followed by a ghetto fire lasting for three weeks. A transport was sent to Bełżec in April, and more shooting operations were launched in the summer; in the course of which Jewish council members and Order Service men were hanged from lampposts. Large transports moved out to Bełżec in September and October [...]”

Let us leave to one side the transports to Bełżec, the shooting in March 1942 and the Jews “hanged from lampposts”, and content ourselves

\(^{86}\) In Treblinka, Bełżec, Sobibór and Chelmno supposedly only a handful of “worker Jews” (Arbeitsjuden) needed for the operation of the killing areas were excepted from immediate death.
with the first item of ‘information’ here, the shooting of not less than 10,000 Jews in the cemetery in Stanislavov on 12th October 1941. This number corresponds to the population of a small town. What evidence does Hilberg support himself with, what sources does he name as proof for the ten thousandfold murder in the cemetery? Simply and utterly none, not even a witness statement. In other words: The story is a pure chimera.

For the mass shooting of over 40,000 Jewish armaments workers that supposedly took place on 3rd November 1943 in Majdanek and its outlying camps Travniki and Poniatova, Hilberg at least gives us sources in the form of witness statements (p. 563; DEJ, p. 537). Italian researcher Carlo Mattogno was the first to investigate rigorously this supposed massacre—which has inexplicably entered the ‘Holocaust’ literature with the name “harvest festival” (Erntefest)—on a scientific basis and prove conclusively that it should be relegated to the realm of legend. 87

4. As Sheep to the Slaughter ...

If it is true that millions of Jews were killed in killing factories set up for that purpose, it would not have been possible to keep this a secret. Hilberg himself acknowledges this glaring fact. Concerning the ‘extermination camps’ Chelmno, Treblinka and Bełżec, for example, he writes:

“Poland [...] was the home of all six killing centers and Polish transports were moving in short hauls of not more than 200 miles in all directions. Many eyes were fixed on those transports and followed them to their destinations. The deputy chief of the Polish Home Army [(a London-directed underground force), General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, reports that in the spring of 1942 he had complete information about the Kulmhof (Chelmno) killing center in the Warthegau. [...] In July 1942 the Home Army collected reports from railroad workers that several hundred thousand Jews had disappeared in Treblinka without a trace.39[88]

Sometimes the information spilling out of the camps was quite specific. In the Lublin district the council chairman of the Zamość ghetto, Mieczysław Garfinkiel, was a recipient of such news. During the early spring of 1942 he heard that the Jews of Lublin were being transported in crowded


88 Hilberg is apparently not aware of the absurdity of this assertion, otherwise he would not quote it. Treblinka was opened in July 1942, as he notes on p. 956; the exact date was the 23rd July. (Enzyklopädie des Holocaust, op. cit. (note 36), v. III, p. 1430). This means that, according to Hilberg’s ‘railway workers’, in this tiny camp within at most 8 days (23rd-31st July) hundreds of thousands of Jews ‘disappeared without a trace’!
trains to Będzec and that the empty cars were being returned after each trip for more victims. He was asked to obtain some additional facts and, after contacting the nearby Jewish communities of Tomaszów and Będzec, was given to understand that 10,000 to 12,000 Jews were arriving daily in a strongly guarded compound located on a special railroad spur and surrounded by barbed wire. The Jews were being killed there in a ‘puzzling manner’. Garfinkiel, an attorney, did not give credence to these reports. After a few more days, two or three Jewish strangers who had escaped from Będzec told him about gassings in barracks. Still he did not believe what he heard. On April 11, 1942, however, there was a major roundup in Zamość itself. Counting the remaining population of his ghetto, Garfinkiel calculated a deficit of 3,150 persons. The next day, the thirteen-year-old son of one of the council functionaries (Wolsztayn) came back from the camp. They boy had seen the naked people and had heard an SS man make a speech to them. Hiding, still clothed, in a ditch, the young Wolsztayn had crawled out under the barbed wire with the secret of Będzec.40” (pp. 517f.; DEJ, pp. 492f.)

Like a wildfire the news of the mass gassings must have spread over all Poland in these circumstances, and from there out into the bordering countries! How did the Jews now threatened with annihilation react to this Job’s news? Raul Hilberg does not hide it from us:

“Throughout Poland the great bulk of the Jews presented themselves voluntarily at the collection points and boarded the trains for transport to killing centers. Like blood gushing out of an open wound, the exodus from the ghettos quickly drained the Polish Jewish community of its centuries-old life.” (p. 520; DEJ, p. 495)

No, it is not complimentary, the testimony that Hilberg gives here about his ‘race’ or his fellow Jews! The descriptions of Jewish attempts at flight or resistance that follow this passage in no way blot out the monstrousness of the assertion that the great bulk of Jews voluntarily allowed themselves to be sent to the killing centers.

Again in August 1944, when almost the whole of Polish Jewry had been exterminated—as we are told by our ‘Holocaust’ pope—the Jews of the ghetto of Łódź boarded the trains to Auschwitz willingly and without resistance, because:

“In fact, Łódź had become the largest ghetto by default, its 80,000 people struggling with a prison diet and a twelve-hour day for two more years. Then, in August 1944, announcements were posted in the ghetto under the heading ‘Verlagerung des Ghettos (transshipment of the ghetto).’

89 The German-language edition states here that the growth was due to delays in deportation. But how can delays in deportation be explained when the ‘extermination camp’ Chelmno lay close by?
The Jews were ordered to present themselves for Verlagerung on penalty of death.\textsuperscript{116}

This time the Jews knew where [German chief of the ghetto administration office] Biebow wanted to send them, and something like a sit-down strike ensued in workshops I and II. These Jews had held out for so long that now, with the end of the war in sight, they were not willing to go to their deaths voluntarily. The Germans decided to proceed with propaganda warfare. [...] Biebow [...] began to speak. [...] Biebow had always tried to do his best. He still wanted to do his best—namely, 'to save your lives by moving this ghetto'. Right now, Germany was fighting with her last ounce of strength. Thousands of German workers were going to the front. These workers would have to be replaced. Siemens and Schuckert urgently needed workers, Union needed workers, the Częstochowa munitions plants needed workers. [...] The trip, said Biebow, was going to take ten to sixteen hours. Food had already been loaded on the trains. Everybody could take along 40 pounds of luggage. Everyone was to hold on to his pots, pans, and utensils, because in Germany such things were given only to bombed-out people. So, common sense. If not, and then force were used, Biebow could not help anymore.\textsuperscript{117}

The Jewish workers of workshop areas I and II changed their minds. They surrendered. By the end of August the ghetto was empty except for a small cleanup Kommando.\textsuperscript{118} The victims were shipped not to Germany, to work in plants, but to the killing center in Auschwitz, to be gassed to death.\textsuperscript{119}” (p. 543; \textit{DEJ}, pp. 517f.)

Were they dumb as straw or pathetically cowardly, the Jews of Łódź? They were the former if they believed the promises of their (alleged) executioners. They were the latter if they foresaw their destiny and nevertheless made no attempt to flee, or, if there were no chance for flight, at least to try to take as many of their executioners to death with them as they could. Like sheep they marched to the slaughter, we are told!

The Hungarian Jews did exactly the same thing, also in 1944. Thus Hilberg:

“in Hungary the Jews had survived until the middle of 1944. They were killed in Hitler’s final year of power, in an Axis world that was already going down to defeat. [...] The Hungarian Jews were almost the only ones who had full warning and full knowledge of what was to come while their community was still unharmed. Finally, the Hungarian mass deportations are remarkable also because they could not be concealed from the outside; they were carried out openly in full view of the whole world.” (pp. 859f.; \textit{DEJ}, p. 797)

On this subject Hilberg quotes Dr. Rudolf Kastner, former co-president of the Hungarian Zionist Association, as follows:
In Budapest we had a unique opportunity to follow the fate of European Jewry. We had seen how they had been disappearing one after the other from the map of Europe. At the moment of the occupation of Hungary, [meaning, March 1944] the number of dead Jews amounted to over five million. We knew very well about the work of the Einsatzgruppen. We knew more than it was necessary about Auschwitz... We had, as early as 1942, a complete picture of what had been happening in the East with the Jews deported to Auschwitz and other extermination camps. (p. 888; DEJ, p. 823)

On 19th March 1944 Adolf Eichmann and a few other “deportations experts of the RSHA” met in Budapest with the leaders of the Jewish community. On this meeting, Hilberg reports:

“During the meeting Eichmann performed one of the greatest shows of his career. In the words of the historian Levai, ‘he virtually hypnotized the Jewish Council and through that body, the whole of Hungarian Jewry’

Eichmann began his speech by giving the assembled Jews the bad news. First, he said, the Jewish labor battalions would have to be increased. However, he assured his listeners that the Jewish workers would be treated well and that they might even be permitted to return home at night. Second, a Judenrat would have to be formed with jurisdiction over all Jews in Hungary. The Judenrat would have to act as a channel for German orders, as a central financing and taxation agency, and as a central depository of information concerning Hungarian Jews. Third, the Judenrat would have to publish a newspaper that would contain all the German orders. [...]

So much, said Eichmann, for the German requests. [...]

The Jews were relieved. Now they knew what they had to do. Falling all over each other, they began to draw up plans for their Judenrat. [...]

At the same time, the council addressed a manifesto to the Jewish population to maintain discipline and obey orders:

On receiving orders from the Central Council it is the duty of every person to report at the place and time indicated.” (pp. 889f.; DEJ, pp. 824f.)

Let us recapitulate: The Hungarian Jews had “full knowledge of what was to come”; they had seen how the Jewish population groups had been “disappearing one after the other from the map of Europe”; since 1942, they had “a complete picture of what had been happening in the East with the Jews deported to Auschwitz and other extermination camps” — and what did the Jewish leaders do? They willingly undertook the role of “channel for German orders” and ordered the Jewish common people “to report at the place and time indicated” by the Central Council. Hilberg says the Jewish

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90 After Hungary entered the war against the USSR on the side of the German Reich, Hungarian Jews were conscripted also. Certainly they did not serve under arms, but were organized into labor battalions.
community leaders had become “a pawn in German hands” (p. 890; DEJ, p. 825). In other words, the Jewish leaders were cowardly evildoers who wittingly and willingly cooperated in the destruction of their people—assuming, of course, that Hilberg is right and that the purpose of the deportations really was the extermination of the deportees

5. People ‘Gassed’ in Auschwitz Turn up in Stutthof

Concentration camp Stutthof, lying 36 km east of Danzig—mentioned by Hilberg in his giant work only four times—is of overriding importance for the understanding of German Jewish policy in the next to last year of the war. Between June 29 and October 28, 1944, Stutthof received over 50,000 Jews, who were sent from the Baltic area (Kaunas and Riga) and also from Auschwitz.91 Some of the deportation lists can be inspected at the archive of the Stutthof memorial.92 Of the Jews who came from Auschwitz, 11,464 were from Łódź and 10,602 were from Hungary.93 Also a considerable number of the Jews transported to Stutthof from Riga and Kaunas were Hungarian.92 It is clear that they had been sent to the Baltic area first when they were deported from Hungary—possibly through the railway junction at Auschwitz—to be employed there on munitions projects, before the approach of the Red Army forced the Germans to retreat from the Baltic states and to evacuate the camps there.

At that time Stutthof performed the function of a major distribution center for labor forces; the—mostly female—Jewish prisoners were apportioned among the various outlying camps, transferred to camps further south or employed as agricultural labor.94

We have found that the transferees from Auschwitz to Stutthof constituted only a small proportion of the Hungarian Jews deported from Łódź and Hungary. The disposition of the others is mostly still unclear; as the archives in the East are opened to research, the subject may be progressively better understood. On the other hand, every Jew that left Auschwitz alive is a powerful argument against the theory that the latter served as an annihilation center for European Jewry. The transfers also square with the countless documents that deal with the deployment of Jews as labor. This

91 On this see Jürgen Graf and Carlo Mattogno, op. cit. (note 40).
92 Archiwum Muzeum Stutthof, I-II B- 11 (Transport lists).
94 J. Graf and C. Mattogno, op. cit. (note 40), pp. 107-114.
also explains why Hilberg does not once mention the transfers to Stutthof, since they fail to support his presupposed point of view.

The reason for the deportation of people from Łódź and Hungarian Jews was apparently that which the German chief of the ghetto administration office gave to the Jews of Łódź and which Adolf Eichmann gave in his meeting with the Hungarian-Jewish community leaders. The Jews were to be drafted as workers. Those that could not be employed at Auschwitz and its outlying camps were transferred to Stutthof—or to other camps or armaments works.

The Jews were aware of this. Had they known or even suspected that they faced cold-blooded murder they would not have boarded the trains to Auschwitz. Of course, they were not the miserable weaklings that Hilberg so disparagingly portrays. Foreseeing certain death, they would definitely have taken any chance at escape or taken to arms in despair.

In other words, the community leaders of Łódź and the Hungarian Jews recognized the extermination and gassing stories which had been assiduously disseminated for years for what they were, namely war propaganda.