Preface

Ernst Gauss aka Germar Rudolf

1. The End of Jean-Claude Pressac

French pharmacist Jean-Claude Pressac has been for some time the darling of our media with respect to research into the history of the concentration camp Auschwitz. They hope to have found in him the technically qualified expert who could counter the arguments and the methods of those who wish to revise the history of the concentration camp complex Auschwitz in particular and the Holocaust in general. The contributions of Manfred Köhler and Serge Thion give an overview of this exaggerated praise from the judicial system, the media and scientists. Köhler's article makes it clear that these hymns of praise have been premature and that Pressac's book does not meet the standards of scientific work.

Even in terms of technical competence, the work Pressac has delivered is unsatisfactory in many respects, as Prof. Faurisson and Carlo Mattogno will show in this book. His friends of the same cast of opinion also seem to be skeptical of his technical qualifications, since the first English version of Pressac's work which recently appeared was somewhat censored by being subsumed in a collection supported by other pieces, as Prof. Faurisson will show in his short addendum.

The present book was written to demonstrate to the world that the work of the one who has been advertised as the Auschwitz specialist were better considered to be a novel than a study which should be taken seriously as a work of historical science. It constitutes a corrective review, with the consequence that the historical account on the subject of the concentration camp complex Auschwitz will be fundamentally revised. The revision of the historical account on concentration camp Auschwitz, begun by Revisionists and brought before a broader public by Pressac, now returns to its authors.

2. Should There Be Freedom for Revisionism?

This book, which proclaims a dispute on the traditional historical version on the annihilation of the Jews in the concentration camp complex Auschwitz through an analysis of Pressac's book, claims to be in conformance with the standards of science. If this is the case, it is owed the protection of the German Basic Law, which in Article 5, Section 3 protects science without restriction, on the condition that the book does not itself harm the similarly protected fundamental rights of others.

From a certain quarter it is always objected that works that end in completely or partly denying or refuting the intentional, industrially organized annihilation of European Jews by the National Socialists – in other words, the Holocaust – are fundamentally incapable of being scientific, since anyone who operated according to scientific method must automatically come to the conclusion that the so far accepted description of the Holocaust corresponds to historical reality.

Others object that Revisionist works should not be afforded the protection of the Basic Law even if they fulfill the formal criteria of the scientific method. The reason given for this is that it is a clearly established fact that the Holocaust happened and that any assertion to the contrary represents an offense to the human dignity of Holocaust victims, their descendants and relatives and to the Jewish people generally. In this way the fundamental rights of others are massively harmed. Since human dignity must be valued more highly than freedom of science, it should be forbidden to science to adopt such theories. In any case the mere proposition that the Holocaust – the purposeful, planned destruction of the Jews in the Third Reich – did not happen is an implicit claim that Holocaust history was knowingly fabricated for the purpose of deception, and possibly to obtain material or political advantage. This would be an affront to the dignity of anyone who might be implicated thereby that can not be tolerated.

In what follows I would like to analyze this matter more thoroughly.

3. Unrestricted Research and Revision: Foundations of Science

The basis of the reasoning just stated is that freedom of science should be thought a lesser good than human dignity. This idea is very doubtful. Science is not merely a plaything of unworldly researchers. On the contrary, it is not only the highest manifestation of our capacity to perceive and understand, but in the word's most general sense it is the basis of every human capacity to perceive and to understand that exceeds that of animals. It is the basis of every human mode of living and doing that is distinguishable from the modes of living and doing of the animals. One could say that science, in the word's most comprehensive sense, first made man human and gave him that dignity that lifts him above the animals. The freedom of science is thus inextricably involved with human dignity.

Scientific understanding serves human decision-making both on the individual and on the political level; the natural drive to create knowledge was implanted in man by nature. In order to make valid decisions, that is, decisions which conform to reality, it is an essential precondition that scientific knowledge be true. Truth as the only test for scientific validity means: every other influence on the process of discovering scientific truth, whether economic or political, must be excluded. It also must be made certain that all scientific findings can be published and distributed without hindrance, because it is only through the unhindered confrontation of scientific opinions in open forums that it can be insured that the most convincing opinion, being most in conformity with reality, will prevail. In our case that means that there can be no reason to suppress an opinion in accord with scientific norms in any way.

Increasingly in recent years the freedom of science in the area of contemporary history has been constrained, in that scientists who offend against the ruling Zeitgeist through expression of their scientific views have their social reputations destroyed by political or media inquisitions or are threatened with loss of their professional standing. Sometimes the judicial system is brought in in order to add criminal prosecution to professional ruin. The recently intensified criminal prosecution of Revisionist opinion through the modification of Sec. 130 of the Penal Code (race persecution) on 1.12.1994 is a striking example of the growing inquisitorial drive in our society.

Prof. Hellmut Diwald has characterized this shielding of discussion on the Holocaust with the penal law as follows: [1]

In the history of the Third Reich there is no complex of questions that is more hopelessly kept from close examination by German historians than the horrible fate of the Jews during the war. The Basic Law of Bonn does guarantee the freedom of research and science. But a series of related decisions and convictions has shown that one would be well advised neither to expose oneself to the risk of being a test case for the freedom to invoke this fundamental right by choosing this subject matter nor to expose oneself to the lesser risk of even peripherally violating the 21st Penal Code Modifying Law of 13th June 1985 and provoking an indictment due to offense. This means that the very complex of questions of contemporary historical research has been made taboo that, together with the continually upheld theme of collective guilt, burdens the German people like no other event.

There is a general understanding that the intensified punishment of Revisionist viewpoints primarily serves to combat uneducated, unteachable right-wing extremists. The philologist Arno Plack thinks otherwise. In his view, the [2]

"actual intended groups" with respect to the punishment of the "Auschwitz lie" [are ...] the office-holding German historians, who, because of forced confession (one time!) and threat of punishment impose upon themselves a judicious form of restraint with respect to certain decisive questions. [...] A judicial system that clamps down on [possibly, E. G.] erroneous opinions that are not due to any intention to injure is not without effect. It fortifies the widespread tendency to be silent in the face of burning questions; it demands readiness to give the expected lip service and it stirs up doubt as to [apparently, E. G.] irrefutable facts even among all those who have learnt, "The truth always prevails". [...] Finally, such a judicial system stimulates denunciation. [...]

By the principles of a liberal community, the best weapon in the battle of opinions is not prohibition or punishment, but argument, the "weapon word", as Lev Kopelev has said. If we are not to lose our belief that democracy is a viable form of society, we can not accept that it should defend against [presumably, E. G.] making Hitler inoffensive with the same compulsory methods which the dictator himself quite naturally used to suppress contrary opinion. [...] I believe his [Hitler's] ghost, his repression of mere doubt, his tendency simply to prohibit what was not acceptable in the ruling system, yet needs to be overcome in those who overcame him.

As part of the intensified persecution of Holocaust Revisionism, our legislators and judges have apparently decided to put Revisionist research on the "Index of Forbidden Knowledge". One indication of this was the confiscation of the book Grundlagen zur Zeitgeschichte ordered by the Municipal Court of Tübingen, which was carried out on 27.3.1995. [3] In effect, a moratorium on research has been declared. The research goal to clarify the technical background of the supposed mass murder of Jews has been put into the "Catalog of Forbidden Research Goals". The only opinions and conclusions that will be accepted are those that fit the predetermined picture.

This official behaviour is incompatible with the thousands of years old principles of Occidental theory of knowledge, which Prof. Hans Mohr has concisely expressed as follows: [4]

"Freedom of research" also implies that the purpose of research may be anything whatever. An "Index of Forbidden Knowledge" or a "Catalog of Taboo Research Objects" are unreconcilable with self-understanding and the worth of science, because we must unfailingly and in all circumstances maintain that understanding is better than ignorance.

It is equally unreconcilable with self-understanding and the worth of science when the protectors of the Zeitgeist may require this or that conclusion or forbid some other. That science is free always and before all else presupposes that it is free to take any approach and reach any conclusion. No science that is worthy of the name can exclude any conclusion beforehand.

Prof. Walter Nagl [5] maintains that every scientific discipline possesses a certain conservative inertia with respect to its paradigms that can sometimes be supported by campaigns of "Political Correctness". Usually it takes a number of researchers attacking the same point in order for newer theories to prevail over older, no longer adequate theories. Although some science has held good for thousands of years it is also true that no scientific paradigm – whether in the natural or in the social sciences – can claim to have eternal validity. Rather it is the duty of scientists and also lay people not simply to accept the obvious, supposedly finally proven facts, even when they are there in the textbooks, but always to look critically on them. [6] This applies also to research into the Holocaust complex. I agree with historian Prof. Dr. Peter Steinbach that our Basic Law protects the freedom of scientific research without "if" or "but" and favors unrestricted freedom to pursue any question and make any finding:

That applies not only to, but particularly to, historical science, in which it is not a question of pointing out a red thread and making it obligatory, but rather of proposing ideas that can be discussed. That will unquestionably be divisive and controversial in a pluralistic society. [7]

In particular, in historiography and in the publication of the findings thereof there is now the phenomenon that Eckhard Fuhr, speaking of the treatment of irksome scientists, has characterised as systematic falsification. [8] It is not the scientifically evaluable truth of a scientist's assertion that is the criterium for the media and the politicians, but rather the question of its political usefulness.

Under pressure to conform to the Zeitgeist and in fear of the inquisition conducted by the media and the political and judicial authorities, many scientists feel forced to compromise and to adjust their research findings to the political standard. This suppression of the full truth or even the promotion of a half- or even a complete lie due to public pressure is the most baneful thing that can happen to science. Such conduct not only destroys respect for science but also inflicts immeasurable harm on our people and on all mankind.

I agree with Prof. Dr. Christian Meier's assertion that truth which has been arrived at by the rules of the scientific method can never be dangerous. [9] In the writing of history especially, it is half-truths and lies that are dangerous for the amity of peoples.

With respect to our thesis this much is clear: No matter which theories Revisionists start out from and no matter which results they may come to, they should be free to do their work and should not be restricted in any way as long as they satisfy the norms of scientific method. To penalize a certain result of scientific work would be to kill the freedom to do science and with it science itself, which without question violates Article 19, Sec. 2 of our Basic Law, which lays down that no fundamental right may be infringed on in an essential way. Restriction of the freedom of science can therefore never depend on what theories a scientific work starts out from or what results it comes to. The freedom of science can only be restricted with respect to the methods that are used to acquire knowledge. For example, research which endangers the mental or physical health of persons is not covered by the Basic Law.

Since in science there are no final or self-evident truths, then also there can be no such truths in respect to scientific investigation of the events of the Third Reich. Even in this subject area it is a fundamental duty of science to criticize old results and revise them when necessary. Revisionism is an essential component of science.

4. Toward Freedom of Expression

It is not difficult to protect the freedom to express an opinion that corresponds with that of the ruling class. The most horrible dictatorships fulfill that criteria. A state that honors human rights distinguishes itself in that it allows the freedom of expression to those whose ideas are not welcome to the ruling class. The right to freedom of expression is the citizen's defense against state interference: [10]

In its historical development down to the present the function of fundamental rights consists in providing the citizen defensive rights against the use of state power (BVerfGE 1, 104, Decision of Federal Constitutional Court). Standing judicial opinion is that this is its primary and central effect even today (BVerfGE 50, 337).

Taken on its own merits, an opinion that contradicts the current historical description of the Holocaust endangers neither the formal foundations of our state, such as fundamental rights, popular sovereignty, the division of power or the independence of justice, nor the formal legitimacy of those who hold power, so such an opinion must be tolerated. However, there is hardly any other area in which our state proceeds more repressively against undesired opinions than with respect to the Holocaust. [11]

The right to free expression can only be restricted when its exercise infringes others' fundamental rights. When someone says the Holocaust did not happen the way we have always heard it did, or says it did not happen at all, his right to free expression will be defacto denied. The reason given for this will be that such assertions harm the dignity of those Jews once persecuted and killed, their descendants today and the entire racial group of Jews.

One may consider this principle as an extended protection of the direct victim of a crime, in order to protect him from slander thereafter. For example, everyone would accept that it cannot be allowed for people to slander a woman who was raped, saying she invented the story of the rape only to sneakily get retribution from or take revenge on the tried and convicted rapist for some other reason. This applies even when there may be doubt as to the truth of the woman's representations in light of her statements and the court records. The same protection must be allowed to every Jewish fellow citizen whose former (possibly only claimed) torturer was duly convicted. Nevertheless, it is not clear to me why all the relatives of the victim and all the members of the same religious group should enjoy the same protection.

In every case, however, he who maintains that the supposed crime did not take place must be given the opportunity to produce the proof of his assertion. Anything else would be contrary to the order of a state under the rule of law. To determine whether the proof is correct, there must be scientific examination of the evidence.

For example, a scientific work that comes to the conclusion that there never was a Holocaust would not improperly diminish anyone's dignity, since the results of scientific work may not be forbidden without coming into conflict with the fundamental right to freedom of science (Art. 19, Sec. 2, Basic Law). In a state under the rule of law, such a work must be permitted to be used as evidence in order that an accused might provide evidence in defense of his opinion.

5. Battlezone "Common Knowledge"

Section 244 of our criminal procedure permits the court to refuse evidence on the grounds of "common knowledge". This provision allows our courts not to have to prove over and over again things that have been proven in court many times before and which are commonly accepted as true. There is nothing objectionable about this paragraph, which seeks to restrict delaying tactics in judicial procedure. To return to our previous example, a woman who has already proven several times and in the opinion of the court could still prove that she actually was raped should not be required to prove it anew before the whole world each time someone comes forward who disputes the event. Of course, this "common knowledge" principle does not exclude that there are circumstances under which the evidence should be reexamined. It is a judicial rule that common knowledge does not endure forever and that there are times when the principle should be suspended.

For one, the principle fails when a significant dispute about the commonly accepted fact occurs in public. For another, every court is duty-bound to suspend the principle when it receives evidence that is superior in evidentiary value to evidence formerly submitted.

In my experience, it is media inquisitions organized by the mostly left-leaning governing elites which make it impossible that there be a significant public dispute on Holocaust matters. This would not be so bad if one at least were permitted to present in court proof that the evidence that he brought was superior in evidentiary value to what had been presented to German courts before. Unfortunately, in recent years we have had to suffer that every court in Germany would refuse any motion to determine merely the fact, whether new evidence was superior to old, on the grounds of "common knowledge". The evidentiary value of evidence is something that can certainly never be common knowledge. However, the Federal High Court has approved the practice that motions to determine evidentiary value may be denied on the basis of the common knowledge of the Holocaust, and even said that it did so because it had always been done. [12] If this ruling becomes settled, it will be clear that the judicial system of the Federal Republic of Germany has elevated the de facto principle of common knowledge of the Holocaust to an unchangeable dogma.

6. On the Defense of Human Rights In Our Country

The most radical position of the opponents of Holocaust Revisionism is that which denies all freedom to Revisionism whatever, on the grounds that Revisionism and its theories harm the dignity of Jews. I have some questions to propose about this:

• Whose human dignity is more diminished, that of the victim whose suffering is disputed, or that of the convicted criminal who may have been erroneously convicted?

• Whose human dignity is more harmed, that of the victim of whom people say his suffering was a lie, or that of the scientist who people say has constructed a pseudoscientific structure of lies?

German courts protect the dignity of every Jew who, in connection with the Holocaust, has been accused of lying directly or (supposedly) indirectly, from any conceivable attack. In the sense of the extended protection for victims this may be acceptable.

When the same courts use the absolutized objection of "common knowledge" to refuse to hear any mitigating evidence they dismiss or prohibit everything that could protect the dignity of the scientist who is accused of constructing a pseudoscientific structure of lies. Does not the scientist have the same right to the protection of his dignity as any of our Jewish citizens? Is he not entitled to have his arguments heard and considered in court?

German courts protect at law the dignity of the actual or supposed victims of the Holocaust from any conceivable attack. When these courts use the absolutized objection of "common knowledge" to refuse to hear any mitigating evidence they dismiss or prohibit everything that could restore the dignity of the convicted SS man. Does not the convicted SS man have dignity that needs to be protected? Many of our contemporaries may have asked themselves this question, and the fact that many would probably answer this question spontaneously, No, shows that the principle of equal treatment before the law laid down in Article 3 of the Basic Law has long disappeared from the understanding of many citizens. But, in fact, the dignity of the SS man and the dignity of the Jew are equally deserving of protection.

German courts correctly protect the dignity of the supposed Jewish victims from any conceivable attack, in accordance with Article 1 of the Basic Law. At the same time they dismiss or prohibit anything that could restore the dignity of those of whom it is said, they were members of a criminal organization. They dismiss or prohibit anything that could restore the dignity of the ordinary Wehrmacht soldier, of whom it is said by his service he enabled and prolonged the murders.

German courts protect dutifully the dignity of the members of the entire Jewish race from any conceivable attack. They dismiss or prohibit anything that could restore the dignity of the entire German people, who are marked as criminals.

The German state and its component German judicial system accept every injury to the dignity of the German people and each German person, or injure it themselves, and forbid anything that might defend this dignity. Does not this state and this judicial system commit a massive breach of Article 1, Section 1 of the Basic Law, in which human dignity is stipulated as inviolable and the state is enjoined to use every power it possesses to defend the dignity of every person?

Does not this state and its component judicial system violate the equal treatment principle laid down in Article 3, Sections 1, 3 of the German Constitution by defending the dignity of the Jews but neglecting or even forbidding the defense of the dignity of Germans generally, and of SS members, Waffen SS members and Wehrmacht soldiers in particular?

Does not this state and its component judicial system deny to all who hold a natural scientific worldview the freedom to profess that worldview, a freedom specified in Article 4, Section 1 of our Basic Law? We are compelled to believe in bodies that burn of themselves, in the disappearance of millions of people without any trace, in geysers of blood spurting from mass graves, in boiling human fat collecting in incineration pits, in flames meters high spurting from crematory chimneys, in Zyklon B insertion hatches that are not there, in gassing with diesel motors, which is not practical for murder, and so on and so forth. The next thing we will be asked to believe in are witches riding on broomsticks to the Boxberg.

Does not this state and its component judicial system refuse to allow someone to communicate his opinion of things connected with the Holocaust from the standpoint of his natural scientific worldview, contrary to Article 5, Section 1 of the Basic Law?

Finally, does not this state and its component judicial system deny to every researcher, scientist and teacher his right to conduct an unprescribed, unrestricted search for the truth and to publish his scientific opinion, contrary to Article 5, Section 3 of the Basic Law?

It would appear that this state and its component judicial system are inflicting an ongoing injury to the majority of its people, in that it refuses the presentation of possible mitigating evidence, contrary to Articles 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the Basic Law,

It would seem to be high time to change this practice if we are to keep it from being said that this state is grossly inimical to human rights. A first step should be to stop banning scientific books and throwing their authors into prison.

Ernst Gauss, Rothenburg o. d. T., 5 May 1995


NOTES

1.

Deutschland einig Vaterland, Ullstein, Berlin 1990, p. 71.

2.

Hitlers langer Schatten, Langen Müller, Munich 1993, pp. 308ff.

3.

Ernst Gauss (ed.), Grundlagen zur Zeitgeschichte, Grabert, Tübingen 1994. Cf. Az. 4 Gs 173/95 of the Municipal Court of Tübingen. This concerned a collected volume of Revisionist pieces on the Holocaust. It can be obtained through: VHO, Postbus 46, B-2600 Berchem 1, Belgium (DM 70.-).

4.

Natur und Moral, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1987, p. 41.

5.

Gentechnologie und Grenzen der Biologie, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1987, p. 126.

6.

Ibid., p. 127.

7.

P. Steinbach, ARD-Tagesthemen, 10.6.1994

8.

FAZ, 23.12.1994, p. 1.

9.

In: Berichte und Mitteilungen der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Heft 3/1994, p. 231.

10.

K.-H. Seifert, D. Hömig (eds.), Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Nomos, Baden Baden 1985, pp. 28f.

11.

On the reasons for this behaviour, cf. G. Rudolf, in: A. Mohlau (ed.), Opposition für Deutschland, Druffel, Berg am See 1995.

12.

Bundesgerichtshof, Az. 1 StR 193/93.


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